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Abstract
One of the main elements of the current reform of electricity trading in the UK is the
change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We
analyse this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopo-
listic supply), with demand uncertainty.
We …nd that under perfect competition there is a trade-o¤ between e¢ciency and average
prices between the two auction rules. We also establish that a move from uniform to dis-
criminatory pricing under monopoly conditions has a negative impact on pro…ts and output
(weakly), and ambiguous implications for prices and welfare.
JEL Nos: D41, D42, D44, L94.
Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions; Price discrimination; Electricity.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The current reform of electricity trading arrangements in England & Wales is the main motivator
for this paper. The electricity regulator’s New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), which
have been introduced in March 2001, consist mainly of replacing the existing day-ahead system-
marginal-price (SMP) auction (i.e. a uniform price auction) with a pay-as-bid (PAB) auction
(i.e. a discriminatory auction) in a balancing market preceded by bilateral contracting (Ofgem
(1999)). The goal of this paper is to provide some analytical insights on the potential e¤ects of
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1this reform.1
In this paper we compare the two pricing rules (SMP and PAB) for the two polar cases of
perfect competition (i.e. each bidder can only sell one in…nitesimal unit of output) and perfect
collusion (i.e. monopoly bidding), under conditions of demand uncertainty and of complete
information over costs.
We …nd that under both cases a switch from SMP to PAB leads to a fall in output (as long
as demand is elastic). This is always accompanied by a fall in average prices under competitive
conditions, leading to a direct trade-o¤ between e¢ciency and prices with this market structure.
Under monopoly bidding the introduction of PAB has ambiguous implications for prices and
e¢ciency: we …nd that if demand uncertainty is contained and the marginal cost schedule ‡at
(relative to demand), PAB can lead to lower prices and higher e¢ciency. However, both of these
e ¤ e c t sc a ng ot h eo t h e rw a y( i . e .w i t hh i g hd e m a n du n c e r t a i n t ya n ds t e e pc o s t s ) .I ng e n e r a lo u r
monopoly results show that the exercise of market power is harder under PAB, and that …rms
with market power may react in ine¢cient ways to a switch from SMP to PAB.
In discussing our results we elaborate on the links between monopoly SMP and PAB bid-
ding and price discrimination. We argue that SMP allows the monopolist to neutralise the
e¤ects of demand (or “type”) uncertainty and obtain an optimal price for each demand reali-
sation (subject to the “no-…xed-fees” constraint implied by the auction rules we model). SMP
is therefore analogous to third-degree price discrimination. Under PAB bidding on the other
hand the monopolist su¤ers from the presence of demand uncertainty, and its problem is es-
sentially equivalent to non-linear pricing with the additional presence of a “no-…xed-fees” and
“no-quantity-discounts” constraint relative to the standard case. PAB can therefore be thought
of as “fourth-degree price discrimination” (i.e. constrained non-linear pricing, or third degree
price-discrimination with type-uncertainty).
We also comment on the impact of a change of price rule in the context of oligopolist
interaction (i.e. the intermediate case between perfect competition and perfect collusion). We
argue that, on the basis of existing results from multi-unit auction theory, switching from SMP
to PAB may have signi…cant e¤ects in this case, by changing the nature of competition from
“Cournot” to “Bertrand” with an associated reduction in market power.
The rest of this introductory section proceeds as follows: we …rstly describe the nature of
electricity auctions and the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) put forward by the
UK industry regulator Ofgem; we also brie‡y examine the relevant existing literature on multi-
unit auction theory, in particular on the comparison between uniform and discriminatory price
auctions, and then outline the rest of the paper.
1The issue of whether to introduce PAB electricity pricing has also been raised in the Californian wholesale
market, and the U.S. federal electricity regulator (FERC) has attempted, and failed, to introduce PAB for “high”
bids (above $150/MWh) as a temporary market power mitigation measure (FERC (2000)).
21.1 Electricity auctions and NETA
In liberalised energy markets at least some wholesale electricity is typically traded in an auction-
like environment, where producers (or generators) submit supply schedules to a System Operator
(SO hereafter) which is responsible for the real-time balancing of aggregate supply and demand.
Most of the demand in electricity auctions is bid by the SO itself, which aggregates it from
downstream distribution companies. Direct (and price-responsive) demand-side bids are often
a l l o w e di nt h e s ea u c t i o n s ,b u tt y p i c a l l ym a k eu pas m a l lp r o p o r t i o no ft o t a ld e m a n d . 2
Depending on the market design the proportion of total production which electricity auctions
trade varies from 100% (as in the current “gross” England and Wales Pool) to small proportions
of energy (as in systems which rely on bilateral contracting with a balancing pool, e.g. Norway
and Sweden).3
Electricity auctions (or Pools) are typically repeated very frequently (e.g. every day) and
work as follows: suppliers (i.e. generators) submit price-quantity bids for production and an
auctioneer (i.e. the SO) then constructs a non-decreasing aggregate bid function and crosses
demand and supply. Under SMP-pricing, producers who are “in merit” (i.e. whose bid is below
the marginal or “stop-out” price at which aggregate supply equals demand) earn the marginal
price times the quantity bid. Under PAB-pricing, producers earn their own bid times their bid
q u a n t i t y ,a sl o n ga st h e ya r e“ i nm e r i t ” .
The aggregate marginal cost structure in wholesale markets tends to be well known to market
participants, as generation technology is relatively standard. Costs of production can vary sub-
stantially across generation units of di¤erent technology. Given the non-storability of electricity
and the need to meet signi…cant demand peaks, an optimal plant-mix is usually characterised by
an upward sloping industry marginal cost schedule which is associated with a downward-sloping
…xed costs pro…le. For example the current England and Wales plant mix ranges from nuclear
generators (high …xed cost, low marginal cost) to open cycle gas turbines (low …xed cost, high
marginal cost).
The current England and Wales trading arrangements are based around a day-ahead “Pool”,
which was introduced when the industry was liberalised in 1990. All generators wishing to
produce in the Pool needed to place their bids for the next day to the SO. They did this once
per day, specifying three components of cost4, which the SO then used to set prices for each
half-hour of the following day, using an algorithm based on a SMP-type pricing rule.
The NETA proposals involve the abolition of the day-head Pool, which has been substituted
by three separate markets: a long-term contract market, a short-term (e.g. on-the-day) screen-
2Wolfram (1999a) estimates price elasticities of around 0.1 on England and Wales pool data.
3See Wilson (1999) for a discussion of issues relating to market design and decentralisation in electricity
markets.
4These include one “pure” marginal cost (i.e. a fuel cost) and two partially ”…xed” costs (i.e. no-load heat
a n ds t a r t - u pc o s t s ) .
3based Power Exchange (PX), and a “real-time” balancing market (BM). The last of these markets
is operated by the SO from 3 and 1/2 hours (or less) before real-time until real-time. In
this market the SO calls for half-hourly demand and supply bids to balance the market, to
meet unexpected changes in players’ positions (e.g. a generator may have an outage).5 The
BM settles bids and o¤ers which are “in merit” according to the principle of pay-as-bid, and
charges/pays players which are out-of-balance after the contract markets the demand-weighted
average of o¤ers to produce (or decrease consumption) or of bids to decrease production (or
increase consumption), according to whether the player is short or long of energy.6
We focus in this paper on the market-clearing mechanism chosen for the BM, abstracting from
the presence of the markets which precede it. We do so for reasons of tractability, and because
backwards induction arguments suggest that the design of the BM will have a signi…cant impact
on earlier trading (especially in the PX), and is therefore a central element of NETA (even
though it may involve relatively limited amounts of energy). We recognise in our modelling
the residual nature of the BM market, and therefore place emphasis on the issue of demand
uncertainty, which is likely to be a prominent feature of this market.
1.2 Insights from the auction theory literature
The central issue we model in this paper is the comparison between uniform and discriminatory
multi-unit sealed-bid procurement auctions. We do so in a setting which broadly corresponds to
an electricity auction, namely an environment where demand is endogenous (even if on aggregate
relatively inelastic) and uncertain, due to the presence of stochastic shocks and, in the case of
the real-time balancing market, unknown contract position by market participants. In addition
in our set-up supply costs are assumed to be known to all market participants, which is broadly
t h ec a s ei nw h o l e s a l ee l e c t r i c i t ym a r k e t s .
The set-up just described is therefore not the typical auction-theory environment, where
what is typically uncertain is the distribution of costs (or values) across bidders or the common
value of the object(s) being auctioned. There are however insights which can be gained from
the auction theory literature in relation to the three central features of the environment we
model: the comparison between pricing rules in divisible goods auctions; demand elasticity (or
endogenous quantity); and demand uncertainty.
Pricing rules in multi-unit auctions are examined by a number of authors, most notably
Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993), Wang and Zender (1999) and Ausubel and Cramton
(1998). These papers examine auctions of divisible goods (“share auctions”) in a multi-player
context, where at least some players demand more than one unit of the good. Both Wilson and
5Or players may simply wish to change their production or consumption schedules relative to their commitments
in the contract markets, thereby giving rise to a balancing requirement.
6The system therefore displays so-called “dual imbalance pricing”. We abstract from this feature in our
modelling.
4Back and Zender show that in a common-value auction uniform pricing can enable strategic
bidders to obtain seemingly collusive outcomes.7 As Back and Zender show this can lead to
dramatically lower revenue for the seller by comparison with discriminatory auctions in equi-
librium. For example in the case of no uncertainty over the common value of the objects for
sale v and no capacity constraints, bidders will bid ‡at bid functions at v in any pure strategy
equilibrium of the discriminatory auction (i.e. a “Bertrand” outcome will prevail). By contrast
uniform price auctions can sustain a multiplicity of equilibria, some of which have prices well
below v.8;9
Ausubel and Cramton extend this analysis to a context with private values, showing that
in many “reasonable” cases (e.g. i.i.d. values, ‡at and symmetric demand schedules) uniform
pricing always implies an ine¢ciency relative to a pay-as-bid auction and leads to lower revenues
(i.e. higher prices, in an auction to sell goods, as the one we model in this paper). This is due to
the e¤ects of “market power” in a uniform price auction which arises from the fact that “large”
players have incentives to bid strategically to a¤ect their pro…ts on infra-marginal units. This
result however does not carry over to asymmetric cases, and the comparison between pay-as-bid
and uniform pricing in e¢ciency terms is in general ambiguous in a private values setting.10
Most papers in the auction theory literature deal with …xed quantities (for sale or purchase).
Endogenous quantity changes results, as shown by Hansen (1988). He considers a procurement
auction with elastic demand, and a winner–takes-all context (i.e. an indivisible-good situation).
Quantity endogeneity implies that a …rst-price auction (i.e. pay-as-bid) yields lower prices than a
second-price auction, since in the latter prices are determined by the producer with second-lowest
cost, which reduces quantity and increases the deadweight loss. This result is however derived
in a single-winner setting, and is not directly applicable to the comparison between uniform
and discriminatory pricing in multi-unit auctions. This is because both of these pricing rules
determine market-clearing quantity at the intersection of the aggregate bid curve and demand,
eliminating the quantity reduction e¤ect of second-price rules.
Demand uncertainty in auctions is examined by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), who consider
7These papers therefore show that the multi-unit uniform price auction is not analogous to the single-unit
second-price auction and that, in particular, it does not induce truthful bidding, as many commentators have
argued (especially in the context of the U.S. securities auctions), committing the “uniform price auction fallacy”.
8This is because uniform price auctions allow bidders to submit very steep demand schedules, which imply
a high cost of defection from a quantity-withdrawal (or market-sharing) equilibrium for rivals, thus enforcing
a low-price equilibrium which is qualitatively similar to a “Cournot” outcome. With discriminatory auctions
“out-of-equilibrium” bids of this kind have a direct impact on price, and are therefore not optimal.
9When players receive independent signals about the common value of the objects for purchase a Winner’s
Curse e¤ect will be present. This is likely to be stronger in a discriminatory price environment relative to a
uniform price setting, but the trade-o¤ betwen this e¤ect and the strategic bidding e¤ect on the seller’s revenue
does not seem to be well understood yet (see Wang and Zender (1999) and their “conjecture” (p. 28)).
10This arises because of the “…rst-price” features of discriminatory price auctions, which tend to reduce e¢ciency
in the presence of asymmetries between bidders.
5a multi-unit procurement auction with a uncertain downwards sloping demand. They show that
uncertainty makes the exercise of market power harder in an oligopolistic context, lowering prof-
its relative to Cournot and making the most implicitly collusive strategies described by Back
and Zender in uniform price auctions unfeasible. A related insight is provided by McAdams
(2000) who shows that the seemingly collusive equilibria of the uniform price auction are elimi-
nated in both the adjustable-supply auction (where the auctioneer sets quantity after the bids
have been made, to maximise revenue) and in the increaseable-supply auction (which is like the
adjustable-supply format, with an additional minimum-quantity constraint). This is due to the
fact that in both of these cases demand-uncertainty is used by the auctioneer to unravel strategic
bidding.
Finally, Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (1999) …nd that with (bounded)
uncertainty over the quantity sold and no uncertainty (or symmetric signals) over the common
value of the objects on sale, discriminatory auctions still outperform uniform-price auctions in
terms of seller revenues for all but one of the equilibria of the uniform-price auction.
1.3 Overview of the paper
In this paper we model the di¤erence between SMP and PAB pricing for two polar cases of
market structure/conduct (perfect competition and perfect collusion), abstracting from strategic
interaction between players. In the absence of uncertainty the two pricing regimes in these
settings yield the same result: under perfect competition all players would know what the
marginal production unit on the system is for any given level of demand, so that under PAB
they would all bid at the marginal cost of that unit, achieving the same outcome they would
obtain under SMP by bidding at cost. Similarly, the monopolist under PAB and with no
uncertainty can bid all its production at the price which corresponds to where demand crosses
its optimal SMP bid function11, thereby achieving the same outcome under the two regimes.
However, as we show below a shift from SMP to PAB has an impact on both market prices and
quantities in the presence of demand uncertainty which, as argued above, is likely to characterise
the electricity Balancing Mechanism under NETA given its role as a residual market.12
Sections 2 and 3 present our results on perfect competition and perfect collusion respectively,
deriving the equilibrium bid function in each case, and comparing output, price and welfare
outcomes across the two auction rules. In Section 4 we discuss three aspects of our results: the
relationship between monopoly PAB bidding and price discrimination (and non-linear pricing in
11This is de…ned formally below, and is the locus of bids which equate marginal revenue and marginal cost for
all demand realisations.
12Note that e¤ective demand uncertainty can be a signi…cant factor also in “gross” pools (even when aggregate
hourly demand is known with precision ex-ante) if generators can only o¤er a single bid for multiple demand
periods (e.g. as in previous England and Wales market design). Our analysis, which assumes demand uncertainty,
is therefore also relevant to this market design option.
6particular); the implications of the choice between PAB and SMP on strategic interaction; and
the impact of PAB on market dynamics (and entry in particular). Section 5 summarises our
results and concludes drawing some implications of our analysis for electricity market design.
2 Perfect Competition
2.1 Set-up
In this section of the paper we present the case of perfect competition. This is an interesting
case given its nature as a benchmark of bidding behaviour in electricity auctions, and also its
potential relevance as the long-run market structure of a de-regulated industry (e.g. following
entry by independent producers, and “commoditisation”).
We therefore assume an atomistic market structure, with many independently-owned elec-
tricity producers and with each producer supplying one in…nitesimal unit of output dq at a cost
of °q, where q can be interpreted as an index for an individual producer supplying dq.T h eqth
producer’s position in the industry’s aggregate marginal cost curve corresponds precisely to this
index. The industry marginal cost function is thus given by MC(q)=°q,w i t h° ¸ 0.
The demand-side is represented by a linear income-inelastic inverse demand curve, p(q)=
¹ ¡ ½q, where ¹ » U[¹;¹] and ½ ¸ 0, which is bid truthfully into the market by an auctioneer
(or System Operator) under both auction rules.
Producers are assumed to be risk-neutral. Each producer submits a bid for its entire (in-
…nitesimal) unit of capacity into the market. Aggregating these individual bids in “merit or-
der”, that is, from cheapest to most expensive, yields the industry’s non-decreasing bid function,
¯(q).13
The market clearing process is the same under SMP and PAB, and determines equilibrium
quantity at the intersection of realised demand and the aggregate bid function. Payments by
the auctioneer to the producers however di¤er across the two auction regimes: under SMP all
producers which bid below or at the market clearing price obtain this price (i.e. the marginal
and average price paid by demand coincide), whilst under PAB producers are paid their bid,
as long as this is below or equal to the market clearing price (i.e. the marginal price is always
above the average price paid by demand).14
13Both in this case and in the monopoly case modelled below, we assume that the industry cost and bid functions
are smooth, following the approach introduced by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), and …rst applied to electricity
markets by Green and Newbery (1992). This di¤ers from the discrete step functions approach introduced by von
der Fehr and Harbord (1993), especially in the context of static strategic interaction (see the Discussion section).
14This is equivalent to assuming that demand pays the marginal bid on the system, and that the surplus earnt
by the auctioneer due to the fact that generators are paid-as-bid rebated to …nal consumers in a lump-sum manner.
This assumption allows us to “…x” demand behaviour across the two auction formats, and focus the analysis on
the supply-side e¤ects of the change in pricing rule. An alternative approach, which we do not explore, would be
72.2 SMP
Under SMP each producer optimally bids its output at cost, since the price they receive is
exogenous to their bid, given that they are never price-setting by assumption (this is the second-
price auction result, in a context where no player is selling more than one unit). The industry’s
optimum bid function therefore corresponds to the industry marginal cost function °q,w h i c h
implies that all pro…table gains from trade are exhausted.
2.3 Pay-as-bid15
Under PAB each producer’s bid maximises expected pro…ts (assuming risk-neutrality), which
are given by:
I E(¼)=Prq(\in merit”)(¯(q) ¡ °q)=( 1¡ F(¯(q)))(¯(q) ¡ °q)
where F(¢) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the marginal bid. Expected pro…ts
are simply the product of the probability of a bid being accepted and of the mark-up on cost
associated with the bid. In contrast with the SMP auction, bidders face a trade-o¤ between
their bids and their mark-ups. This is because higher bids reduce the probability of producing,
but also increase the mark-up if the unit is called to produce.
Each producer maximises pro…t given other producers’ bids, as captured by F(¢). We there-
fore look for bids that are consistent with this maximisation. Taking …rst-order conditions with
respect to ¯ we …nd that







where f(¯) denotes the probability density function of ¯,a n dh(¢) is the hazard rate of ¯.
Immediately we have two results: a producer at the margin for the highest demand realisation
(i.e. when F(¯(q)) = 1) bids at cost, and the bid price exceeds cost everywhere ‘below’. The
“no distortions at the top” result therefore holds in this setting, even though for reasons which
di¤er from the standard optimal mechanism design set-up.16
Equation (1) implies that in equilibrium
¯(q)=¹ ¡ ½q = °q +
1
h(¹ ¡ ½q)
Assume now that ¯(q) is linear.17 It follows that 1
h(¢) must be a linear function of q.G i v e nt h a t




= ¯ ¡ ¯(q) (2)
to assume that demand consumes as long as the average bid it pays is below its marginal bene…t
15This is partially based on Federico and Rahman (1998).
16A similar result is obtained by Nautz (1995).
17We prove in Appendix 1 that this is so in equilibrium.
8where ¯ is de…ned by the intersection of the industry bid function with maximum inverse demand.








where q is de…ned as the intersection of the industry bid function with maximum demand.
The second expression for ¯(q) follows from the fact that the producer who is in the merit order
only if demand is at its highest level must bid at cost - as shown above. Substituting for the








Equation (3) de…nes the optimal linear bid function for q>q PAB, where qPAB is given by
the intersection of ¯¤(q) with the inverse demand schedule at ¹ =¹,a sl o n ga st h i si sp o s i t i v e ,
and is zero otherwise (i.e. qPAB =m a x ( 0 ;q(¹;¯¤(q))). Producers with marginal costs lower
than °qPAB …nd it optimal to bid at ¯ = ¯¤(qPAB) rather than ¯¤(q) given that they run with
probability equal 1 in any case. The optimal bid function is therefore horizontal up to qPAB
and then it is upwards sloping, increasing with q at half the slope of the marginal cost curve, so
that producers with cost higher than °qPAB …nd it optimal to bid at the average of their cost
and the marginal cost at maximum demand (see Figure 1). This is the unique equilibrium bid
function in a competitive PAB market, as proven in Appendix 1.
2.4 SMP-PAB comparison
2.4.1 Output and E¢ciency
Under competitive conditions output is always lower under PAB than under SMP pricing rules,
given that under PAB all players (except for the one which produces only if demand is at its
maximum level) mark-up their cost. This induces a deadweight loss for all demand realisations,
except for the one corresponding to ¹ = ¹. This in turn implies that the PAB pricing rule is
less allocatively e¢cient than SMP under the competitive benchmark.18
Note also that it is possible that under PAB the bid function lies above demand for some




° ), in which case the output-contraction and welfare-reduction e¤ect due to PAB is
even stronger.
18Both SMP and PAB regimes achieve productive e¢ciency, i.e. the aggregate cost of producing the equilibrium
level of output is minimised. This result, for the PAB case, relies on the assumption that all producers have the
same attitude to risk (namely, risk neutrality). Allowing for di¤erential attitudes to risk among producers would
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From the PAB equilibrium bid function we can directly obtain the following Lemma, which
describes the impact of a switch from SMP to PAB on producers’ expected pro…ts.
Lemma 1 All producers except for the one with marginal cost °q earn lower expected pro…ts
under PAB than SMP as long as demand is non-vertical. The absolute reduction in pro…ts due
to the introduction of PAB is decreasing in the producers’ marginal cost.
Proof. The fact that producers lose out from PAB follows from the fact that (i) ¯ is below
time-weighted average prices under SMP (i.e. ¯ =
°
2(qPAB + q) <
°
2(qSMP + q) given that
qSMP >q PAB (where qSMP is given by the intersection of minimum demand with the industry
marginal cost schedule). This implies that low-cost (or base-load) producers (i.e. those with
marginal costs below °qPAB) su¤er a fall in expected pro…ts as a result of the shift to PAB; (ii)
producers with marginal costs between °qPAB and qSMP earn lower prices when they produce
under PAB than SMP (following the same line of reasoning of case (i)) and also produce less
frequently under PAB; (iii) producers with marginal costs between qSMP and q earn the same
expected revenue when they produce under the two price regimes (i.e. the average of their own
costs and of °q) but are called to produce less frequently under PAB.
The fact that low-cost producers su¤er more than other producers from the introduction of
PAB follows directly from the computation of expected pro…ts, and is proved in the Appendix.
10Lemma 1 shows that PAB forces producers to give up expected rents relative to SMP. This is
because marking-up bids over costs hurts them under conditions of demand elasticity, by reducing
total output. The result that low-cost producers su¤er in a PAB auction arises because these
producers face a higher opportunity cost (in term of foregone pro…ts) of not being dispatched
than other producers, which “forces” them to bid aggressively to run with certainty and prevents
them from “free-riding” on the marginal prices set by mid-merit and peak producers.19 The
possible dynamic implications of this result are discussed in Section 4.
2.4.3 Prices
Utility regulators typically place more weight on the e¤ects on the level of consumer prices than
on overall e¢ciency considerations when assessing a policy reform. It is therefore important to
compare prices across the SMP and PAB auction regimes from the point of view of regulatory
policy. To compare price outcomes between SMP and PAB we compute the expected unit
expenditure of the auctioneer under each auction rule. We take a demand-weighted average of
this measure, to re‡ect the e¤ective average price faced by demand. This is given by the ratio of
expected industry revenue (E(R)) and expected quantity sold (E(Q)) under each auction rule.
Proposition 1 Demand-weighted average prices are higher under SMP than under PAB in a
competitive setting, as long as demand is elastic.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x . 20
Proposition 1, combined with the results on the output comparison, reveals that there is a
direct trade-o¤ between allocative e¢ciency and average prices when comparing PAB and SMP
pricing rules in a competitive setting. A switch from SMP to PAB reduces average output and
welfare, but it also reduces average expenditure by the auctioneer. This arises from the fact
that PAB induces producers to bid non-competitively, but at the same time it both weakens the
price-quantity correlation induced by SMP and it forces all producers (and especially low-cost
ones) to give-up inframarginal pro…ts. These two e¤ects lead to lower average expenditure by
demand.21
19Wolfram (1999b) draws similar implications in discussing NETA.
20This partially follows the approach used by Green and McDaniel (1999), who establish revenue-equivalence
between PAB and SMP for the case of vertical demand.
21Note that simple average prices will be lower under SMP than under PAB if demand is su¢ciently inelastic.
For instance if demand is vertical demand-weighted average prices are the same under the two pricing rules, which
implies that simple average prices are lower under SMP given that higher price-demand correlation induced by
this pricing rule.
11Our results therefore suggest that introducing PAB in electricity auctions under competitive
conditions22 can enable policy-makers (e.g. the industry regulator) to “deliver” lower consumer
prices (and therefore mitigate market power), but that this comes at the cost of lowering the
overall e¢ciency of the market.
3 Monopoly (Perfect Collusion)
3.1 Motivation
What happens to the exercise of market power when we switch from SMP to PAB? We examine
the monopoly case, as the benchmark case of pricing behaviour under conditions of market
power.
In an electricity context one can think of the monopolist as being a large generator with
a competitive (and price-taking) fringe, or a group of large generators which, thanks to the
incentives provided by frequently repeated interaction, perfectly collude and act as a monopolist
in the market (i.e. they succeed collectively to extract monopoly pro…ts).23
Given the high frequency of interaction in electricity auctions, the insights gained by exam-
ining the monopoly case are relevant to understanding the impact of changes in pricing rules in
wholesale electricity auctions in the presence of market power.
3.2 Set-up
This is based on the same assumptions made in the competitive case, with the key di¤erence
that the atomistic producers indexed q are now assumed to be under joint ownership, implying
an aggregate cost function for the monopolist given by C(q)=1
2°q2.
We also explicitly assume here that bidding rules of the electricity auction we model are such
that the monopolist needs to bid each of its units of production separately, and cannot o¤er
di¤erent payment-quantity bundles (e.g. as under second-degree price discrimination).24 This
means that the monopolist bid function under both SMP and PAB needs to be non-decreasing in
22Arguably the current market structure in England and Wales is moving towards these conditions, given the
large sales of power plants by the incumbents (National Power and PowerGen) which have occurred over the
course of 1999 and 2000.
23Given the high frequency of interaction in electricity auctions (e.g. daily) players’ discount factors are close
to 1, implying that the monopoly equilibrium is typically a sustainable outcome of the repeated game, as long as
players are su¢ciently similar (so that for all colluding players the industry monopoly outcome is superior to their
Minimax payo¤). In the presence of strong cost asymmetries side payments between players may be required to
sustain monopoly pricing in equilibrium.
Players may restrain from extracting monopoly prices for fear of regulatory intervention, or because of the
threat of entry.
24This bidding restriction is present in most electricity auctions, and will apply to the balancing mechanism
under NETA.
12quantity, since the auctioneer can always “pick” the cheap bids …rst.25 As we discuss below, this
assumption rules out both …xed-fees and quantity-discounts (or decreasing price schedules)26,
constraining the monopolist in its pricing behaviour.
3.3 SMP
Optimal monopoly quantities and prices are given by the locus of points where marginal revenue




; p¤ = ¹
½ + °
2½ + °
Under SMP, and in the presence of uncertain demand, these are achieved by bidding the following
linear function:27
MP¤(q)=( ½ + °)q (4)
With SMP the monopolist therefore secures maximum pro…ts (given by the MR = MC con-
dition) at every realisation of demand, since the uniform pricing mechanism permits her to
optimally price-discriminate between di¤erent demand-states (subject to the “no …xed fees”
constraint), and to neutralise the e¤ects of demand uncertainty. SMP e¤ectively enables the
monopolist to practice third-degree price discrimination, where each demand-realisation can be
thought of as a di¤erent market which can be priced separately from the others.
Note that the assumption that each demand realisation is bid truthfully by the auctioneer
plays an important role in generating this result. If consumers were allowed and able to engage
in strategic behaviour to maximise consumer surplus, the monopolist problem under SMP would
boil down to the choice of the optimal marginal payment schedule, and SMP and PAB pricing
regimes would be outcome-equivalent (given that under PAB the monopolist can only bid a
marginal payment schedule).
3.4 Pay-as-bid
In a PAB pricing regime with demand uncertainty the monopolist can no longer rely on a unique
bid function to maximise pro…ts for all demand realisations.
Marginal bids which are optimal (i.e. equalise marginal revenue and cost) for low demand
realisations now have an impact on the average price charged to high demand realisations, given
that the average price received by the monopolist is no longer only a function of the marginal
25Note that this does not lead to inter-temporal arbitraging by demand, since the System Operator cannot
delay consumption and needs to meet all of its demand in the corresponding session of the market.
26That is,
T(q)
q needs to be non-decreasing in q (where T(q) indicates the total payment charged by the mo-
nopolist for q units).
27This corresponds to the Supply Function Equilibrium for a monopolist, as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
13bid (as under SMP). This means that the monopolist price-discriminates across demand states
less e¤ectively than under SMP, since she cannot price each “market” (i.e. demand schedule)
separately by setting an optimal marginal bid.
Under PAB the monopolist essentially needs to engage in second-degree price discrimination
with no …xed fees and no quantity discounts (which can be thought of as “fourth-degree price
discrimination”, as we discuss in Section 4.1). This necessarily induces a fall in pro…ts relative
to SMP, as long as there is some demand uncertainty.28













with the understanding that the monopolist submits a ‡at function for any quantity that is
supplied with certainty, and subject to the constraint that the slope of the bid function ¯(q)
be non-negative. q in equation (5) indicates, as in the competitive case, minimum monopoly
output, and is short-hand for max(0;q(¹,¯(q))).29
Proposition 2 (i) If °>½(i.e. the cost function is steep relative to demand) the optimum bid
function for the monopolist in terms of ¹, ¯¤























¹ ¸ 2 , q =0
(6)
This bid function is ‡atter than under SMP and it results in prices for the minimum demand
realisation which are higher than under SMP (i.e. ¯¤
m(¹) >MP¤(¹)), and prices for maximum
demand which are below the corresponding SMP prices (i.e. ¯¤
m(¹) <MP¤(¹)).T h ev a l u eo f¹
at which ¯¤
m(¹)=MP¤(¹) is greater than E(¹)=
¹+¹
2 .

















¹ ¸ 2 , q(¹)=0
: (7)
(ii) If ½ ¸ ° (i.e. the cost function is relatively ‡at) the monopolist bids a ‡at bid function
















½+° , q =0
(8)
Bids are above costs everywhere except for the case °>½and
¹
¹ ¸ 2, where we have “no-












































Low demand variance High demand variance Low demand variance High demand variance
Figure 2: The monopoly bid functions, for °>½ :
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
Proposition 2 shows that the monopolist reacts to the introduction of PAB by reducing
output relative to SMP for low demand realisations, and doing the opposite for high demand
realisations. This is because the bids called under low-demand realisation are those which are
(almost) always called, and therefore have an externality over the monopolist’s pro…t level when
demand is high. This externality induces her to raise these bids above the level implied by
MR= MC for low levels of demand.30 On the other hand the incentives for the monopolist to
price up its output for high demand realisations is reduced with PAB since high marginal prices
yield higher pro…t margins only over the marginal units and not over all units sold (which is the
case under SMP).
The monopoly PAB bid function is therefore ‡atter than the corresponding bid function
under SMP, given the presence of an externality from low bids to high bids (which induces
28If the level of demand is certain, under PAB the monopolist can perfectly replicate the prices obtained under
SMP, by o¤ering a ‡at bid function at the price implied by the SMP bid function at that level of demand.
29Similarly, and as in the competitive case, q stands for q(¹;¯(q)).
30There is therefore a structural change in the monopolist’s bid function from SMP to PAB. When solving
the …rm’s PAB problem, the stock of lower bids a¤ects the bidding incentives in higher-demand states of the
world. On the other hand, an SMP auction entirely removes this externality across units of production. Thus
the Euler-Lagrange equation that applies in the SMP auction boils down to the usual MR= MC result. Under
PAB, the marginal increment in pro…t from increasing the stock of bids must be equated to increments in the








































Low demand variance High demand variance Low demand variance High demand variance
Figure 3: The monopoly bid functions, for ° · ½:
the monopolist to raise the former), and the absence of an inframarginal quantity e¤ect on the
pro…tability of high bids (which induces the monopolist the lower them relative to SMP). The
monopoly PAB function is also ‡atter than the competitive PAB function, given that under
competitive conditions bids do not take into account neither of these two externalities (i.e. PAB
bids by low-cost units are “too low”).
Monopoly PAB pricing corresponds partially to the standard optimal mechanism design
result under hidden information over consumer types (e.g. as applied to non-linear pricing
problems): consumption is distorted the most for low-consumption “types” (i.e. low-demand
states in this case), in order to minimise the “rents” given to high-consumption types.31 However,
given that the monopolist cannot price-discriminate between demand states o¤ering di¤erent
payment-quantity bundles (rather than di¤erent unit prices), the standard “no-distortions at
the top” result does not always apply. We elaborate on this point in the Discussion section of
the paper, exploring the similarities between PAB and non-linear pricing further.
Note …nally that only if marginal costs increase “fast enough” with q (i.e. °>½ ),t h e
monopolist still …nds it optimal to price-discriminate across demand-states and to bid an upwards
sloping function, given that cost of meeting each marginal demand increment is relatively high;
otherwise it does not …nd it optimal to increase its bids with q, and instead bids a ‡at function
(i.e. the constraint that the bid function be non-downwards sloping binds). This ‡at bid function
is at the optimal expected SMP price (i.e. MP¤(E (¹))) if demand variance is relatively limited;
31See, e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978).
16otherwise the monopolist raises its bids relative to expected MP¤ and does not supply some
low-demand realisations. Similarly, in the °>½case if the spread between maximum and
minimum demand is relatively high (
¹
¹ > 2), the monopolist prefers not to supply some demand
realisations, so that q =0 .
3.5 SMP-PAB Comparison
In comparing the e¤ects of a switch from SMP to PAB under monopoly conditions it is convenient
to distinguish between four cases, depending on whether the optimal PAB bid function is upwards
sloping or ‡at, and whether minimum monopoly output under PAB (qPAB;m)i sa b o v eo re q u a l
to 0. We therefore have: Case I, where °>½and
¹
¹ · 2; Case II, where °>½and
¹
¹ > 2;C a s e





















Upwards sloping PAB bid function
Positive minimum PAB output
Case II
Upwards sloping PAB bid function
Zero minimum PAB output
Case III
Horizontal PAB bid function
Positive minimum PAB output
Case IV
Horizontal PAB bid function













Upwards sloping PAB bid function
Positive minimum PAB output
Case II
Upwards sloping PAB bid function
Zero minimum PAB output
Case III
Horizontal PAB bid function
Positive minimum PAB output
Case IV
Horizontal PAB bid function
Zero minimum PAB output
Figure 4: Illustration of the four cases in the comparison between PAB and SMP.
3.5.1 Output
Proposition 2 implies that expected output falls under PAB relative to SMP if °>½ .T h i si s
because the monopolist’s PAB bid function crosses the SMP bid function at a level of ¹ which
is greater than E(¹)=
¹+¹
2 . Also, if the ratio of maximum and minimum demand is su¢ciently
high (i.e. Case II) the monopolist prefers not to supply some low-demand realisations, and sets
¯¤
m(¹) >¹ , which implies qPAB;m =0(where subscript PAB;m indicates the monopoly PAB
case) and an even stronger output-reduction e¤ect.





½+° (Case III). If this last condition does not hold, there is output contraction
under PAB also in the ° · ½ case, since some demand realisations are not supplied and bids are
increased relative to the average SMP price.
Therefore, similarly to our results under perfect competition, the switch from PAB to SMP
leads to a reduction in output (weakly). This e¤ect is particularly strong in the presence of
high demand uncertainty, which implies that under PAB it is too costly to supply low-demand
realisations (in terms of their externality over the pro…ts made when demand is high), whilst
this is “cost-less” (in terms of its externality on other sales) under SMP.
Even when demand uncertainty is relatively limited but costs are steep (i.e. Case I), PAB
induces output-contraction. This is due to the fact that under PAB the monopolist …nds it
optimal to bid a ‡atter function than the SMP one and …nds it relative costly to keep total
output unchanged relative to SMP. This would require output-expansion at high levels of demand
exactly matching output contraction at low-levels of demand, which in turn would lead to an
excessive increase in total costs (given that marginal costs increase relatively fast with quantity,
i.e. ° is high).
The output contraction e¤ect due to PAB is closely related to the “market opening” e¤ect
discussed in the literature on third-degree price discrimination (e.g. Varian (1985)). This refers
to the fact that allowing for third-degree price discrimination (which corresponds to SMP, in
our set-up), as opposed to forcing the monopolist to set a unique price for all markets, may
allow some markets which the monopolist would have otherwise excluded to be supplied. This
e¤ect is present in exactly the same form in our set-up under Case IV, where PAB leads to a
unique price being charged by the monopolist to all types and to the exclusion of some types,
whilst SMP is characterised by price-discrimination (i.e. an upwards sloping bid function), and
no-exclusion.
3.5.2 Prices
The following proposition summarises our results on the PAB-SMP expected price comparison,
where we compute expected prices following the same approach used for the competitive case.
Proposition 3 Expected demand-weighted monopoly prices are lower under PAB than under
SMP in Cases I and III. In Cases II and IV, where the monopolist prefers not to supply some
demand realisations in a PAB auction, prices can be higher under PAB. This is the case if
demand variance is relatively high, and if the cost schedule is relatively steep.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x
This Proposition shows that the price comparison between PAB and SMP is ambiguous.
However prices are higher under PAB only with high demand uncertainty, given that this
18strengthens the output-contraction e¤ect associated with PAB. If demand uncertainty is con-
tained, but still positive, prices fall as a consequence of the introduction of PAB, even though
output may still contract (as under case I, which is therefore analogous to the competitive case).
This occurs because PAB mitigates the price-output correlation induced by SMP and forces the
monopolist to concede information rents to demand.
3.5.3 E¢ciency
Whilst the e¢ciency comparison between SMP and PAB under competitive conditions is im-
mediate (i.e. welfare is higher under SMP given that PAB is characterised by lower output for
all demand realisations except for maximum demand), this comparison is less straightforward
under monopoly conditions.
This is so because, even though average output is (weakly) lower under PAB relative to
SMP (i.e. there is a “total output” e¤ect which favours SMP from a welfare point of view),
a PAB rule may lead to a more e¢cient allocation of output across demand realisations. This
is because under PAB the monopolist o¤ers a ‡atter bid function, which re-allocates output
from low marginal utility consumption to high marginal utility consumption (i.e. output is
reduced for low demand realisations, and increased for high ones). By narrowing the di¤erence
between marginal utilities across demand realisations (and, in the ° · ½ case, equalising marginal
utilities) PAB increases e¢ciency.
This “unequal marginal utilities” e¤ect due to PAB is however balanced by both a “total
output” e¤ect (mentioned above) and by an additional “cost saving” e¤ect in favour of SMP. The
latter arises from the presence of cost convexity, which implies that the total costs of producing a
given level of output are lower under SMP than PAB given that under the former the distribution
of output across demand realisations has lower variance (because of the steeper bid function).32
As Proposition 4 below shows, the welfare gains due to the utility-enhancing output allocation
obtained by switching to PAB do not always outweigh the e¢ciency loss due to both the “total
output” and “cost saving” e¤ects, leading to an ambiguous overall welfare impact of the change
in pricing rule.33
Welfare for each demand realisation ¹ (de…ned as W(¹) in what follows) under each pricing
rule is given by the integral of demand minus the integral of the marginal cost schedule, until
32Both the “total output” and “unequal marginal utilities” e¤ect are familiar from the literature on the welfare
e¤ects of banning third-degree price discrimination (e.g. Varian (1985)). The “cost-saving” e¤ect present with
price-discrimination (i.e. with SMP, in our setting, as argued above) is typically not analysed in this literature
given the assumption that marginal costs are constant or that total costs depend only on total output, and not
on its distribution. This latter condition is not satis…ed in our set-up (e.g. we have that E(C(q)) >C (E(q)),
giving rise to a “cost-saving” e¤ect in favour of SMP.
33Note that given that monopoly pro…ts are always lower under PAB relative to SMP, any welfare gain associated
with PAB is entirely due to an increase in consumer surplus which outweighs the reduction in monopoly rents.
19equilibrium quantity (as given by the intersection of demand and the monopolist’s equilibrium














¹ W(¹)f(¹)d¹ for q > 0
Pr(¹>b ¹)
R ¹
b ¹ W(¹)f(¹)d¹ for q =0
(9)
where b ¹ is such that ¯¤
m(b ¹)=b ¹ under PAB.
Comparing expected welfare under SMP and under the four PAB cases identi…ed above, we
obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Expected welfare is higher under SMP than under PAB as long as °>½(i.e. un-
der Cases I and II). If ° · ½ the welfare comparison is ambiguous: under Case III E(W)PAB >




½ (i.e. costs are ‡at enough); and under Case IV




½ and demand uncertainty is not
excessive.
Proof.I nA p p e n d i x .
This proposition shows that the SMP-PAB welfare comparison is ambiguous. If the monop-
olist’s PAB bid function is upwards sloping (i.e. if costs are steep enough relative to demand),
expected welfare is always reduced by a switch from SMP to PAB. This is because under this
case the “total output” and “cost-saving” e¤ects associated with SMP are strong.
Otherwise the comparison is ambiguous. If costs are ‡at enough (°<°(½)) and demand
uncertainty is not too high welfare is higher with PAB. This is because if these conditions hold
the “total output” and “cost-saving” e¤ect due to SMP are weak, and are dominated by the
“unequal marginal utilities” e¤ect which favours PAB. Therefore, even if average output falls
with PAB (as in case IV), welfare might increase if costs are ‡at enough. However the e¤ect
due to the average output contraction induced by PAB bidding will eventually outweigh the
“unequal marginal utilities” as demand uncertainty increases.
Note …nally that, contrary to the standard result on the e¤ects of not allowing for third-
degree price-discrimination (or SMP, in our setting) we …nd that an increase in output is not a
necessary condition for SMP to be welfare enhancing (i.e. welfare under SMP can be higher than
welfare under PAB also under Case III, if the “cost-saving” e¤ect due to SMP is high enough).
3.5.4 Summary of PAB-SMP comparison under monopoly conditions
Our monopoly output, price and e¢ciency results partially con…rm the ones obtained under a
competitive market structure: a switch from SMP to PAB makes the exercise of market power
20harder, and can therefore lead to lower consumer prices. On the other hand it can induce
ine¢cient behaviour (i.e. a reduction in output and/or an ine¢cient distribution of output),
leading to a trade-o¤ between the price level (lower with PAB) and welfare (also lower with
P A B ) .C o n t r a r yt ot h ec o m p e t i t i v ec a s et h e r ea r eh o w e v e rs i t u a t i o n sw h e r et h i sp r i c e - e ¢ c i e n c y
trade-o¤ does not apply: there are circumstances where PAB is bad in terms of both welfare
and prices (i.e. if demand uncertainty is particularly high), or where it can lead to both lower
prices and higher welfare relative to SMP (i.e. if marginal costs are relatively ‡at, and demand
uncertainty limited). If the latter is the case, a switch from PAB to SMP under perfectly collusive
conditions can be a particularly appealing policy option from a regulatory point of view.34
Figure 5 summarises and illustrates the various cases of the comparison between PAB and
SMP, in terms of price and welfare e¤ects. The …gure plots three schedules, in terms of demand
uncertainty (¹=¹) and relative cost steepness (° ¡ ½): a qPAB;m =0schedule, above which
minimum monopoly output under PAB is zero (i.e. some demand realisations are not supplied),
and below which minimum monopoly PAB output is always positive35;a¢P =0schedule, above
which demand-weighted average prices are higher under PAB than SMP, and below which the
converse is true;36 and a ¢W =0function, below which expected welfare is higher under PAB
than under SMP, and above which the converse is true.37
The ¢P =0and ¢W =0schedules jointly determine three areas in uncertainty-cost
steepness space: a “good” area (G), under which a switch from SMP to PAB leads to both
lower prices and higher welfare; a “bad” area (B), where PAB leads to both higher prices and
lower welfare relative to SMP; and a “mixed” area (M) where PAB leads to a trade-o¤ between
prices (which are lower than SMP) and welfare (which is lower too). As the …gure shows, high
demand uncertainty and relative steep costs imply that PAB can be worse than SMP in terms
of both price and welfare, whilst relatively low demand uncertainty and ‡at cost can make PAB
superior to SMP under both price and welfare considerations.
4 Discussion
In this discussion we address three issues arising from the results we have presented so far: the
relationship between PAB bidding and the theory of price discrimination (and non-linear pricing
in particular); strategic interaction under PAB; and market dynamics with PAB.
34On the other hand, given that demand uncertainty is small in this case, the absolute size of the welfare and
price gains obtained by switching to PAB is limited.
35This schedule is given by
¹
¹ =m a x ( 2 ;
3½+°
½+° ) (see Proposition 2).
36This schedule is obtained from the Proof of Proposition 3 (equations C1 and C2).
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Figure 5: Illustration of the e¤ects of a switch from SMP to PAB under monopoly conditions in
terms of expected prices (P) and expected welfare (W).
224.1 Pay-as-bid and price discrimination
Throughout the previous section we have referred to and used results and terminology from
the price-discrimination literature to describe and analyse monopoly bidding behaviour under
PAB and SMP. In this discussion section we make the link between price discrimination and
the comparison between SMP and PAB more explicit, and argue that monopoly PAB can be
conveniently thought of as “fourth-degree price discrimination” (whilst, as argued above, SMP
is analogous to third-degree price discrimination).
The …rst point to note in discussing the links between PAB and price discrimination is that
the monopoly’s pro…t function under PAB with demand uncertainty is closely related to the one
faced by a monopolist seeking to second-degree price discriminate across di¤erent consumers,
under asymmetric information over the consumer “type” ¹. That is, each demand realisation can
be interpreted as a di¤erent consumer type. Equation (5) corresponds directly to the maximand




T(q(¹)) ¡ C(q(¹))f(¹)d¹ (10)
where T(q(¹)) indicates the monopolist’s total charge for the consumption of q units.
However in the PAB setting we model the monopolist enjoys less freedom in its pricing than
under the more general NLP problem. As discussed above, in a typical electricity auction each
unit of production needs to be priced separately from the others, which implies that the overall
bid function needs to be non-decreasing and that …xed fees cannot be charged (i.e. the T(q(¹))
function needs to go through the origin and has to be weakly convex). The impossibility of
charging …xed fees or o¤ering quantity discounts limits the monopolist’s ability to extract rents
from consumers, which in turn a¤ects its optimal marginal price (or bid) schedule.
Under NLP on the other hand, the monopolist is free to bid a decreasing price function (if she
…nds it optimal to do so), since this can be enforced by an appropriate design of the (T(q);q)
bundles, and she also can appropriate all of the surplus of the lowest-demand consumers by
setting a …xed fee.
The e¤ect of the no-…xed-fees and no-quantity-discounts constraints present under PAB can
easily been seen in the case of no demand uncertainty. The unconstrained monopolist in this case
can price at marginal cost and extract the whole of consumer surplus by means of a …xed fee (i.e.
she will practice 1st degree price discrimination), whilst in the auction we model (i.e. where …xed
fees and quantity discounts are not allowed) she will settle for pricing according to the inverse
elasticity rule (or “MR=MC”) f o re a c hd e m a n d“ t y p e ” .T h i sl e a v e ss o m es u r p l u st od e m a n da n d
23leads to higher marginal payments (or prices) (i.e. as in 3rd degree price discrimination).38;39
As uncertainty is introduced, the monopolist is forced to depart from its …rst best in both cases:
in the case with …xed fees the monopolist will practice non-linear pricing (i.e. 2nd degree price
discrimination), whilst if …xed fees and decreasing price schedules are not allowed it will engage
in PAB-pricing, which can therefore be thought of as “4th degree price discrimination”( i . e .
price-discrimination with type uncertainty and unit-by-unit bidding).
Figure 6 summarises the optimal monopoly tari¤ schedules T(q) under the four degrees
of price-discrimination, for Case III of our PAB-SMP comparison and for ¹ = ¹. The …gure
assumes that there is no demand uncertainty under 1st and 3rd degree price discrimination (the
monopolist knows that ¹ equals ¹, and bids accordingly), whilst the level of demand is ex-ante
uncertain under 2nd and 4th degree price discrimination.40
The impact of the higher degree of discretion in pricing a¤orded by the possibility of charging
…xed fees and o¤ering quantity discounts present under 2nd degree discrimination can be seen
explicitly by solving for the NLP marginal payment schedule, and comparing it to the PAB bid
function, under the same parameter assumptions. The FOC implied by (10) after substituting











where V (¹;q) indicates the consumer gross surplus function.
Making the same parameter assumptions of the previous section (i.e. ¹ » U(¹;¹), C(q)=
°
2q2 and V (¹;q)=¹q ¡
½
2q2 (which implies the inverse demand function p = ¹¡½q)) we obtain








38As we discuss in the previous section, this outcome can be implemented in a uniform price (SMP) auction
even when demand is uncertain, as long as it is “non-strategic”.
39Note that the standard de…nition of third-degree price discrimination assumes that di¤erent consumer types
can be separated (i.e. there is “no-type uncertainty”) and that the monopolist needs to charge a constant unit
price to each type. This second assumption is stronger than the one we impose on the monopolist in our modelling
(namely, no …xed fees and no quantity discounts) but, in the case of no demand uncertainty, is outcome-equivalent.
40A st h e… g u r ei n d i c a t e s ,t h es l o p eo ft h es c h e d u l ef o r1 s td e g r e ep r i c ed i s c r i m i n a t i o ni se q u a lt ot h em a r g i n a lc o s t
at ¹ = ¹ (i.e.
°
½+°¹). Consumption is therefore undistorted, and the whole of consumer surplus is captured by a
high …xed fee (F
FIRST(¹)). The corresponding schedule for 3rd degree discrimination is steeper and goes through
the origin, because of the impossibility of charging a …xed fee. The tari¤ for 4th degree price discrimination also
goes through the origin, but is ‡atter than the one for 3rd degree, given the assumption of type uncertainty,
which induces the monopolist to price at the average optimal “SMP” price. Finally, the schedule for 2nd degree
is steeper than marginal costs everywhere except at the top, and allows for a …xed fee (shown as F
SECOND(¹))
which extracts the rents of low-value types. ¹-types obtain information rents under this schedule relative to 1st
degree discrimination, as shown by the gap between T
FIRST(q(¹)) and T
SECOND(q(¹)) at q = q
FB.
















































































































3 This example illustrates the case ;
Figure 6: Illustration of the four degrees of price discrimination at ¹ = ¹:
This shows that also under NLP the relative size of the slopes of the marginal cost and
demand schedules (i.e. ° and ½) determine the monopolist’s incentive to price up or down with
quantity. Equation (11) also shows that the NLP and PAB marginal price (or bid) functions
are identical in Case II of the PAB-SMP comparison, i.e. with °>½and
¹
¹ ¸ 2 (compare
equations (6) and (11)). This is because only for this parameter combination the constraints
implied by the pricing rules we impose on the PAB monopolist do not bind: the NLP monopolist
wants to bid an increasing price function,42 and does not charge a …xed fee, since the surplus of
lowest-demand type is set to zero by virtue of the fact that this type is not supplied (recall that
for
¹




°+½¹), which is always the case under NLP.
For the other three cases of the SMP-PAB comparison PAB implies distortions everywhere:
for °>½and
¹
¹ < 2, PAB forces the monopolist to grant rents to the ¹-type, which induces her
to increase marginal prices (or bids) relative to the NLP schedule, to appropriate the optimal
amount of consumer surplus; for ° · ½, the monopolist under PAB cannot bid the optimal NLP
price schedule, which is decreasing in quantity, and is forced to bid horizontally, which implies
that prices cannot converge to cost for the highest realisation of ¹.
42This is always enforceable if we assume that consumers need to satisfy all of their demand requirements in
one purchase - i.e. there is no repeat purchasing or, as in the case of electricity, demand is instantaneous.
25Finally, as emphasised in the previous section, our welfare comparison between SMP and
PAB partially conform to standard results on the e¤ects of allowing for third-degree price dis-
crimination. This is because SMP-bidding is like 3rd degree price-discrimination across ¹-types,
whilst PAB bidding corresponds either to a situation with less price-discrimination (i.e. with
a ‡atter, but still upwards sloping, bid function, as under cases I and II) or with no price-
discrimination (i.e. with a horizontal bid function, as under cases III and IV). Therefore the
e¤ects of switching from SMP to PAB are analogous to the e¤ects of banning (or reducing)
third-degree price-discrimination.43
As in the literature on third-degree price discrimination, we …nd that the welfare e¤ects of
“banning” SMP are ambiguous: this is because the (bene…cial) total output and cost saving
e¤ects due to SMP can be outweighed by the e¢cient narrowing of marginal utilities across de-
mand realisations brought about by PAB. Our results show that the latter e¤ect might outweigh
the former two, if costs are su¢ciently ‡at and demand-dispersion su¢ciently small; and that,
given our assumptions on costs44,a ni n c r e a s ei ne x p e c t e do u t p u ti sn o tan e c e s s a r yc o n d i t i o n
for SMP to be welfare-superior to PAB.
4.2 Strategic interaction
As noted in the introductory section of this paper there are some strong results from multi-unit
auction theory on the issue of strategic interaction under SMP and PAB (Back and Zender
(1993); Wang and Zender (1999)): in settings which are not radically di¤erent from electricity
auctions pay-as-bid encourages Bertrand outcomes, whilst uniform pricing allows for “seemingly
collusive” outcomes.45
This sharp di¤erence between the two price rules arises because PAB forces players to com-
pete in “prices”, making it harder for them to defend their market share by placing low infra-
marginal bids. This in turn raises the bene…ts of one-shot deviations from on any strategic/high-
price outcome leading to aggressive equilibrium behaviour, and competitive outcomes.46
43We recognise that from the point of view of terminology, this analogy might be confusing. This is because
SMP (i.e a uniform price auction) leads to (3rd degree) price discrimination across demand types; whilst PAB
(i.e. a discriminatory price auction) implies (more) uniform pricing across demand realisations.
44Namely, that C(q) is convex, which implies that expected costs (over di¤erent realisations of the type ¹)a r e
not only a function of expected output.
45In a procurement auction the results of Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (1999) apply directly
if all players have the same marginal cost of production, and if there is an upper bound on prices.
46Quoting from Wang and Zender (1999, p. 22):
“With risk-neutral bidders, discriminatory pricing intensi…es bidder competition to the fullest extent,
the bidders compete by submitting ‡at demand curves and thus lose any strategic advantage derived
from asset divisibility.[...] Simply using a reserve price of zero together with discriminatory pricing
eliminates all of the bidders’ strategic advantage.”
Ofgem itself seems to have partially relied on this kind of arguments (1999, p. 174):
26Under SMP on the other hand players can use the whole of their bid schedule to achieve
the double objective of setting prices optimally (which is obtained with appropriate marginal
bids) and minimising the incentives for rivals to deviate from a high-price outcome (which is
achieved by placing low “quantity-protecting” inframarginal bids). This outcome essentially
corresponds to a Cournot equilibrium, where players dump their output in the market (i.e. bid
very aggressively for infra-marginal output) and they let the price be set by the intersection of
demand with a vertical aggregate supply schedule. This bidding behaviour favours high prices
(compared to Bertrand, or PAB, competition) given that it leads to steep residual demand
functions in equilibrium for each bidder, which eliminates incentives to deviate from the high-
price outcome. Therefore, whilst SMP allows for Cournot-like equilibria (even though these are
not unique), PAB leads players to behave in a Bertrand fashion.
This relatively stark result needs to be quali…ed by a number of considerations, most of which
are of some relevance to electricity markets. These are: the presence of capacity constraints;
the impact of demand uncertainty; the possibility of incomplete information about costs; the
impact of repeated interaction; and discreteness in the bid functions producers can submit. All of
these factors mitigate the di¤erence between SMP-Cournot and PAB-Bertrand price outcomes,
possibly reversing it.
The role of the …rst factor (the impact of capacity constraints) is straightforward and well-
known: if players are capacity constrained the PAB-Bertrand equilibrium is less competitive,
given that players’ incentives to deviate from a high-price outcome are reduced by the inability
to supply the whole of residual demand. The di¤erence between Bertrand and Cournot price
outcomes therefore is smaller, and it disappears if demand is at a level which implies that the
Cournot equilibrium quantities are greater than the players’ capacities.
As discussed in the introductory section of this paper, the impact of the second factor,
demand uncertainty, on strategic interaction has also been analysed in the multi-unit auction
literature. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that the Cournot outcome is no longer attainable
under SMP with uncertain demand (except at the maximum demand realisation) given that
some of the the low infra-marginal bids necessary to sustain the Cournot outcome can now
become price-setting. This induces players to raise them, which in turn weakens their role as
“threats” against deviations from the Cournot outcome. This leads to lower prices and therefore
“A factor which has clearly provided incentives for strategic bidding is the use of marginal bids by
generators to set Pool prices, which then apply to all output. For example, this allows a generator
to bid relatively highly at the margin for higher cost supplies whilst protecting its volume position
by bidding lower prices for lower cost supplies. If a generator’s marginal bid is undercut by a rival,
the resulting volume loss is relatively small. The generator, knowing that rivals will be adopting the
same bidding strategy, will anticipate that, if it cuts prices, its volume gain will be relatively small.
Price cutting is therefore made less pro…table, and higher prices encouraged.”
27narrows the di¤erence between the Cournot and Bertrand outcomes (Back and Zender (1993)).
The third factor, incomplete cost information, can lead to Winner’s Curse e¤ects, which are
stronger under PAB than SMP, given the “…rst-price auction” properties of PAB. This in turn
can raise the level of prices in PAB relative to SMP, partially compensating for the stronger
strategic advantage enjoyed by players under SMP (Wang and Zender (1999)).47
Fourthly, as argued above, a static analysis of competition in electricity auctions may be of
partial relevance given the high frequency with which these are repeated. As argued above, tacit
collusion may be a more likely state of a¤airs than one-shot strategic interaction in electricity
markets, making the modelling of monopoly behaviour under SMP and PAB an important
benchmark. The results presented in section 3 show that, even though a switch from SMP to
PAB mitigates market power (and therefore con…rms our intuition from static models), this does
not imply that prices (or welfare) will be higher under SMP, if demand is uncertain.
An additional insight regarding the relationship between collusion and the auction price rule
is that SMP may facilitate the attainment of a collusive outcome relative to PAB. This is the
case for reasons which are similar to those put forward above, in the context of static interaction:
by allowing for aggressive infra-marginal bids SMP can deter deviation from collusive outcomes
more e¤ectively than PAB (see Fabra (2001)).
Fifth, and …nal, assumptions on the shape of the bid functions players can submit also
matter for the comparison between PAB and SMP. This is because in a setting with discrete
step bid function (e.g. as in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993)), there is always a discrete
unit of price-setting output at the margin. This provides an incentive to players to deviate
from any high-price outcome, even in the presence of aggressive infra-marginal bids, as long as
players are not capacity constrained. Therefore, if capacity constraints do not bind, competition
at the margin will drive prices to cost under both SMP and PAB, eliminating the bidders’
strategic advantage due to SMP. On the other hand, if demand is su¢ciently high relative to
the players’ capacities, some of this strategic advantage is restored. This is because SMP allows
for asymmetric equilibria, where one player sets the price (acting as a monopolist over residual
demand) whilst the others submit lower infra-marginal bids and are capacity constrained. This
kind of equilibria is not present under PAB, where placing low infra-marginal quantity-protecting
bids is not pro…table, and the equilibrium is therefore more competitive (see e.g. Fabra (2001)).
Existing results on strategic interaction under SMP and PAB therefore partially con…rm
the results presented in this paper on the two benchmarks cases of perfect competition and
perfect collusion. A switch from SMP to PAB will generally reduce market power, and lower
industry pro…ts. Whether this will be welfare-enhancing, or at least price-reducing, depends on
the speci…c circumstances of the auction, and cannot be established a priori.
47In electricity markets incomplete information over costs may arise in a context with sequential markets. For
instance, players bidding in the balancing mechanism under NETA may be uncertain over who has contracted in
the preceding Power Exchange, and may therefore face uncertainty over the costs of their rival bidders.
284.3 Dynamics and Entry
B o t ho u rm o d e l l i n go ft h eS M P - P A Bc o m p a r i s o na n dt h ed i s c u s s i o np r e s e n t e da b o v eo ns t r a t e g i c
interaction under the two price rules have abstracted from the issue of market dynamics and
entry/exit considerations. This is likely to be a major determinant of the impact of a switch
from SMP to PAB in electricity auctions, where entry barriers are relatively low. In this section
we brie‡y highlight two implications of our analysis on market dynamics.
The …rst is related to our results on the impact of PAB in a competitive environment. We
have shown that low marginal cost (i.e. base-load) producers su¤er more than others in a PAB
environment relative to SMP, given that they face a higher opportunity cost of not producing
and therefore need to bid more aggressively to ensure they produce with certainty. This may in
turn have an entry-deterrence (or exit-inducing) impact on baseload producers by not allowing
them to recover their (high) …xed costs, leading to a shift in the plant mix in the market and
to a generally ‡atter aggregate marginal cost schedule. Also, if, as it is arguably currently
the case in electricity markets, technological conditions are such that most of the pro…table
independent entry in the market is likely to be base-load, this e¤ect of PAB might reduce
aggregate independent entry and strengthen market power.48
The second, related, point refers to the interaction between strategic (i.e. large) and compet-
itive (i.e. small) players under the two auction rules. Under SMP small players …nd it relatively
e a s yt of r e e - r i d eo nt h em a r k e tp o w e ro fl a r g e rp l a y e r s .B ys i m p l yb i d d i n ga tc o s tt h e yc a no b t a i n
the price set by the strategic players, who may jointly act as a residual monopolist (by tacitly
colluding). This outcome cannot be replicated under PAB. Under PAB competitive players will
have to raise their bids above costs (i.e. as shown in our competitive model), which will a¤ect
the shape of the residual demand faced by the strategic players. In particular this will become
‡atter at the margin, inducing the residual monopolist to increase output and reduce the market
share of the non-strategic bidders.49 Therefore, for reasons which are distinct from the point
made above, this second e¤ect also suggests that a switch from SMP to PAB will discourage
entry by smaller bidders, by making it harder for them to free-ride on the relatively high prices
set by incumbent (and large) players.50
48Baseload generators have been responsible for most of the independent entry into the England and Wales
market over the last decade, signi…cantly contributing to the erosion of market power in the industry.
49The presence of demand uncertainty might mitigate this e¤ect, given that the monopolist has incentives to
reduce output under PAB as shown by our monopoly results.
50An additional entry deterrence e¤ect of PAB might be due to the bigger “premium on information” this
creates relative to SMP. This will favour large players with access to better information about market conditions
relative to small players, and it may even induce strategic players to create “strategic uncertainty” in the market
(e.g. by randomising their bids). This is an e¤ect of discriminatory price auctions which is often discussed in the
context of securities auctions, and has been stressed in the electricity context by the Blue Ribbon Panel Report
of the California Power Exchange (2001).
295 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has analysed the change from a uniform to a discriminatory price auction in an
electricity auction with demand uncertainty. We have analysed two benchmark cases, perfect
competition and monopoly, showing how the introduction of PAB can lead to average price and
output reduction in both. In the monopoly case however prices may actually increase relative to
SMP, if the output-contraction e¤ect due to PAB is strong because of high demand-uncertainty.
In addition, whilst e¢ciency is always reduced by a switch from SMP to PAB under competitive
conditions, this e¤ect is ambiguous under monopoly pricing.
We have also discussed both why the monopoly case is a relevant benchmark to consider in
electricity auctions, and how the SMP-PAB monopoly comparison di¤ers from existing results
on one-shot multi-unit auctions (which suggest that a switch away from SMP can signi…cantly
erode bidders’ strategic advantage). Our monopoly results partially con…rm the insights from the
static strategic analysis, and therefore lend a degree of support to the UK electricity regulator’s
claim that SMP facilitates the exercise of market power. However they also show that players
with market power may react to PAB in ways which are ine¢cient, leading to higher prices,
lower output and lower welfare. In addition, PAB may be associated with dynamic e¤ects (e.g.
on entry) which may even strengthen market power in the medium-run.
This last point has signi…cant implications for electricity market design: the presence of a
uniform-price “gross” pool allows players to compete in “supply-functions” and achieve mutually
bene…cial price outcomes even under static interaction, and potentially maximum pro…ts in a
repeated interaction (even with uncertain demand). Forcing players to compete in prices by
introducing PAB pricing rules or abolishing gross pools and allowing for continuous bilateral
contracting can potentially remove these equilibria. This however comes at the cost of rendering
entry by independent players less attractive, and possibly slowing down the changes in market
structure which are arguably the key driver of prices in de-regulated electricity markets in the
medium term.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof that the linear bid function is the unique equilibrium in the com-
petitive case.
Proof. Note …rst that equation (1) must be satis…ed for all q. In particular, it must hold for q.A l s o ,q







30where the last equality follows from the properties of the hazard rate, and we are expressing ¯ as a













































(¹ ¡ ¹)n =
°
½¹: (13)




½) AND an =0for every n>1. Notice that, since q
solves for pricing at cost, it follows that
°q = ¹ ¡ ½q ) q = ¹=(½ + °):
Notice that this equality, together with the restrictions on an, satis…es (13). Substituting all this into
(12),
¯(¹)=¹°=(½ + °)+( ¹ ¡ ¹)°=(2½ + °):
Substituting this equation back for q in the demand curve yields the desired result: ¯(q)=( °q+°q)=2.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Lemma 1 states that all producers (except for the one indexed q) earn lower expected pro…ts
under PAB than under SMP (as proven in the text) and that the absolute loss from the introduction of
PAB is decreasing with marginal costs. In what follows we prove the second part of this statement.
We de…ne as ¢(q) the di¤erence in expected pro…ts between SMP and PAB for a producer with
marginal cost equal to °q.We distinguish between three cases of ¢(q): ¢1(q), which indicates the level
of ¢(q) for producers whose marginal cost is below °qPAB; ¢2(q), which indicates the loss for producers
with marginal costs between °qPAB and °qSMP;a n d¢3(q), which relates to producers with costs above
°qSMP.







2(°+½)(°+2½) for q<q PAB
¢2(q)=
°(¹+¹)
2(°+½) ¡ °q ¡
°(°+½)
4¢¹ (q ¡ q)2 for q 2 [qPAB;°qSMP]
¢3(q)=
°2(q¡q)
4¢¹ for q 2 (qSMP;q]




@q are negative, which
in turn implies that ¢1(q) ¸ ¢2(q) > ¢3(q).
31A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. SMP
















where qSMP is given by the intersection of the marginal cost schedule °q with the minimum demand
realisation, and ¢qSMP = q ¡ qSMP. Given that expected quantity equals
q+q
SMP
2 = q ¡
¢qSMP
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where ¢qPAB = q ¡ qPAB and qPAB is given by the intersection of the PAB bid function ¯¤(q) with
the minimum demand realisation, if this is above 0,a n di s0 otherwise.

























° , qPAB =0
(17)
SMP-PAB Comparison
Consider the qPAB > 0 case …rst. Comparing (14) and (17), after substituting for ¢qSMP and
¢qPAB in terms of the underlying parameters (i.e. ¢qSMP =
¹¡¹




E(PSMP) >E (PPAB) i¤
(2½ ¡ °)¹ ¹ +4 ( ° + ½)¹
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° ) implies that
¹
¹ <± ¤(°;½),s i n c e
p
3°2 +1 0 °½+ ½2 >° . This in turn implies that E(PSMP) >E (PPAB):
Turning now to the average price comparison in the qPAB =0case, it is straightforward to obtain
that E(PSMP) >E (PPAB) if (q ¡ ¢qSMP)
2 > 0, which of course always holds.
Note that if demand is vertical, we have that ¢qSMP =¢ qPAB which implies that E(PSMP)=
E(PPAB).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2



















where here we have simply substituted for the demand curve.51 Notice, …rst of all, that we are assuming











































































¹¯(¹) ¡ ¹¯(¹) ¡ (B(¹) ¡ B(¹))
¤
Collecting the terms together we can conclude that (18) is equal to 1
½I E¹F(¹),w h e r e
F(¹)=B(¹) ¡ B(¹) ¡ 1
2
°



















(¯(¹) ¡ ¹)2 ¡ (¯(¹) ¡ ¹)2¤
51Note that q =( ¹ ¡ ¯)=½ ) dq=d¹ =( 1¡ d¯=d¹)=½.
33We can apply the Euler-Lagrange condition to maximise the function 1
½I E¹F(¹) given that F(¹)=























The last condition implies that ¯ is a linear function of ¹. We need a transversality condition to pin




¹ + a constant. (21)
For the constraint that the bid function be upward-sloping not to bind we require that °>½ ,w h i c hi s
intuitive.
We now need to solve for the constant.
Consider …rst the q > 0 case. Maximising expected pro…ts (i.e. equation (5) relative to the constant,
de…ned as c, we obtain the following:
@ -
@c

































We can now o¤er a bid function for the q > 0 case, as given by Proposition 1 - part (i). This bid function
shows that q > 0 if its intercept in q-space is greater than ¹ (i.e.
(½+°)¹+2½¹
2(2½+°) >¹ ), which holds if
¹
¹ < 2:

















where we are expressing the bid function ¯ in terms of q, and exploiting the fact that it is linear with
as l o p eo f
°¡½













34Substituting for q, di¤erentiating w.r.t. the constant c and equating to 0 yields c =
¹
2:
The further results of part (i) of the proposition follow trivially.
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where ¢q = q ¡ q. Di¤erentiating (23) w.r.t. ¯ yields the value b ¯ given in Proposition 1- part (ii) for





















which yields ^ ¯m =
½+°





A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. This proof follows the approach adopted in the competitive case to compute expected demand-
weighted prices.
Expected demand-weighted prices under SMP (de…ned as E(PSMP;m), where subscript SMP;m
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where ® and ¸ in the …rst expression indicate the intercept and the slope of the monopolist optimal bid
function ¯¤
m(q) given in equation (7), and the second expression is obtained by substituting for qPAB;m
and ¢qPAB;m in terms of the underlying parameters of the model.
Comparing (26) and (25) we obtain after some algebraic manipulation that E(P)SMP >E (P)PAB
if:
¹2 £
°(°2 + ½(° ¡ ½))(3¹ ¡ ¹)+½3(3¹ ¡ 5¹)
¤
> 2¹2 £
(°(°2 + ½(° ¡ ½)¹ + ½3(¹ ¡ 2¹)
¤
(27)
35where the l.h.s. equals the r.h.s. for ¹ = ¹ (i.e. the no uncertainty case).
To show that (27) holds it is su¢cient to show that, assuming ¹ = ¹+±,w h e r e± 2 (0;¹), the l.h.s.
of (27) increases with ± faster than the r.h.s. This is equivalent to the following condition:
3(°3(¹2 ¡ ±2) ¡ ½3(¹2 ¡ 3±2)) + 3°½(° ¡ ½))(¹2 ¡ ±2)+8 ½3±¹ > 0
which is always the case given that °>½and ¹ >± .
Case II.








where ® and ¸ are de…ned as in Case I. Comparing (28) and (25) we obtain after some manipulation
that E(PSMP) >E (PPAB) if and only if:
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2 ¼ 2:4). See Figure 5 in the
main text for a plot of this condition.
Case III.
Time-weighted average prices are the same between SMP and PAB in this case, given that the
monopoly PAB bid function crosses the SMP bid function at expected demand. Demand-weighted average
prices are however higher under SMP, given the positive correlation between demand and prices, due to
the SMP bid function being upwards sloping.
Case IV.
Comparing ^ ¯m =
½+°
3½+°¹ with (25) yields the following condition for E(PSMP) >E (PPAB):










3° (3° +8 ½) ¡ °
2°
which does not always hold, and in particular it fails to hold if the di¤erence between ½ and ° is





2 ¼ 2:4). See Figure 5 in the main text for a
plot of this condition.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. De…ne …rstly ¢Wi(±); as the di¤erence between expected welfare under SMP and that under
PAB where i 2f I;II;III;IVg indicates each of the four cases and ± = ¹ ¡ ¹:







Comparing this with the four PAB cases we obtain the following.
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Notice that ¢W(± =0 )=¹3 ¡
2°½¡ 3½2 + ½° +3 ½2 ¡ 3½°
¢
=0 ,i . e .w e l f a r ei st h es a m ea c r o s st w o
regimes under conditions of no demand uncertainty.





½(° ¡ ½)¹2 + °(° + ½)±2¤
> 0
which proves that welfare is always higher under SMP in this case.





¢WII(±)=4 ( ° + ½)(3½ + °)
¡
¹3 ¡ ¹3¢
¡ 3(4½2 + °2 ¡ 4½°)¹3
which is clearly increasing in ±, and is at its minimum at ¢WII(±min) > 0 (from case I, where ±min = ¹).
Also under this case therefore expected welfare is always higher under SMP relative to PAB.













¢WIII(±)=( ° + ½)(°2 ¡ ½2 +2 ½°)
¡
¹3 ¡ ¹3 ¡ 3¹¹±
¢
where the last term in brackets is always positive (for ±>0)( a n di s0f o r± =0 ) , and the second term is




½. If the latter condition holds, ¢WIII(±) > 0 (as in cases I and II)).
Otherwise welfare is higher under PAB. The welfare gap between the two pricing regimes is increasing in
± under both circumstances.










3 ¡ (½ + °)3
´
+2 ½(° + ½)
¡
°2 +2 °½¡ ½2¢¸
As under case II it is clear that ¢WIV(±) > 0 (given that expected welfare under SMP is increasing in
¢¹, whilst expected welfare under PAB is decreasing in ¢¹). Therefore, even if ° · °(½), eventually
the output contraction e¤ect due to PAB will outweigh the ‘higher-output-for-high-demand-realisations’
e¤ect, leading to a reduction in welfare. See Figure 5 for a plot of the ¢W(±)=0schedule for PAB
cases III and IV.
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